AI Agent Execution Firewall

Prompt injection, poisoned context, and compromised tools all end the same way: an agent attempting an action it should never run. An execution firewall assumes the model can be manipulated and enforces the boundary at the only reliable place, the moment a side effect is about to leave the process.

HELM AI Kernel interposes between the agent and real systems. Every consequential proposal is checked against policy, identity, and egress rules in a fail-closed pipeline: anything unknown or unapproved is denied by default, and high-risk actions escalate to a human. Network egress is allowlist-only; an empty allowlist means deny-all.

The result of every decision is a signed receipt you can verify offline. If an attack made it through, the receipt chain shows exactly what ran, under which policy, and why.

Security Boundary

flowchart LR
    Prompt["Agent prompt"] --> Proposal["Tool proposal"]
    Proposal --> Kernel["HELM execution firewall"]
    Kernel --> Decision["Fail-closed decision"]
    Decision --> Receipt["Receipt"]
    Receipt --> Verify["Offline verify"]

flowchart LR
    Prompt["Agent prompt"] --> Proposal["Tool proposal"]
    Proposal --> Kernel["HELM execution firewall"]
    Kernel --> Decision["Fail-closed decision"]
    Decision --> Receipt["Receipt"]
    Receipt --> Verify["Offline verify"]

git clone https://github.com/Mindburn-Labs/helm-ai-kernel.git
cd helm-ai-kernel
make build
bash scripts/launch/demo-proof.sh

Source Truth

• Quickstart
• Execution security model
• MCP integration
• Verification