HELM AI Kernel
OpenCode on HELM
Open-source execution kernel, CLI, MCP, conformance, verification, and compatibility.PublicSource-ownedMarkdown export
What this proves
OpenCode runs through HELM’s fail-closed execution boundary. The launch is driven by a registry-pinned app definition and a safe default-deny policy: HELM installs OpenCode into a sandboxed local container, gates every tool call through the kernel verdict path, and emits a signed receipt for each lifecycle step, from install and healthcheck to teardown. The run ends with an exported EvidencePack that anyone can verify offline, so terminal coding sessions stay inside a provable authority envelope.
flowchart TD
A[OpenCode Agent] -->|Request Tool Call| B(HELM AI Kernel)
B -->|Check Policy| C{Verdict}
C -->|ALLOW| D[Execute Action]
C -->|DENY| E[Block & Return Error]
C -->|ESCALATE| F[Step-Up / Operator Approval]
D -->|Teardown / Receipt| G[EvidencePack Export]Mermaid source
flowchart TD
A[OpenCode Agent] -->|Request Tool Call| B(HELM AI Kernel)
B -->|Check Policy| C{Verdict}
C -->|ALLOW| D[Execute Action]
C -->|DENY| E[Block & Return Error]
C -->|ESCALATE| F[Step-Up / Operator Approval]
D -->|Teardown / Receipt| G[EvidencePack Export]Headless path
helm-ai-kernel launch opencode local-container --headless --output json
Source Truth
- Registry source:
registry/launchpad/apps/opencode.yaml - Policy source:
policies/launchpad/apps/opencode.safe.toml
Evidence requirements
- cpi_output
- kernel_verdict
- sandbox_grant
- launch_receipt
- install_receipt
- healthcheck_receipt
- teardown_receipt
- evidence_pack
- evidence_graph
- mcp_quarantine
- mcp_manifest
- artifact_digest
- cosign_signature
- syft_sbom
- grype_vulnerability_scan
Verify
helm-ai-kernel verify --bundle <pack>