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HELM AI Kernel

OWASP Agentic Top 10 Mapping

Open-source execution kernel, CLI, MCP, conformance, verification, and compatibility.
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Audience

Security reviewers checking which OWASP Agentic AI Top 10 risks are covered by current HELM AI Kernel evidence.

Outcome

After this page you should know what this surface is for, which source files own the behavior, which public route or adjacent page to use next, and which validation command to run before changing the claim.

Source Truth

  • Public route: helm-ai-kernel/security/owasp-agentic-top10-mapping
  • Source document: helm-ai-kernel/docs/security/owasp-agentic-top10-coverage.md
  • Public manifest: helm-ai-kernel/docs/public-docs.manifest.json
  • Source inventory: helm-ai-kernel/docs/source-inventory.manifest.json
  • Validation: make docs-coverage, make docs-truth, and npm run coverage:inventory from docs-platform

Do not expand this page with unsupported product, SDK, deployment, compliance, or integration claims unless the inventory manifest points to code, schemas, tests, examples, or an owner doc that proves the claim.

Troubleshooting

Symptom First check
Published output is stale or incomplete Run npm run helm-public:accuracy in docs-platform, then check the source path and public manifest row for this page.
A claim needs implementation backing Check the Source Truth files above and update the implementation, manifest, source inventory, or page in the same change.

Diagram

This scheme maps the main sections of OWASP Agentic Top 10 Mapping in reading order.

Diagram1. Ingestion & Context Plane -> OWASP Agentic Top 10 Mapping -> Source truth -> Validation -> 3. Execution & Verdict Plane -> Reader action
flowchart TD
    subgraph Ingestion["1. Ingestion & Context Plane"]
        Page["OWASP Agentic Top 10 Mapping"]
        A["Source truth"]
        C["Validation"]
    end

    subgraph Execution["3. Execution & Verdict Plane"]
        B["Reader action"]
    end

    %% Operational Flow Edges
    Page --> A
    A --> B
    B --> C

    %% Premium Styling Rules
    style B fill:#3182ce,stroke:#2b6cb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#fff
Mermaid source
flowchart TD
    subgraph Ingestion["1. Ingestion & Context Plane"]
        Page["OWASP Agentic Top 10 Mapping"]
        A["Source truth"]
        C["Validation"]
    end

    subgraph Execution["3. Execution & Verdict Plane"]
        B["Reader action"]
    end

    %% Operational Flow Edges
    Page --> A
    A --> B
    B --> C

    %% Premium Styling Rules
    style B fill:#3182ce,stroke:#2b6cb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#fff

This file is a code-oriented inventory of retained control points in the OSS kernel.

OWASP Category Repository Control Points
ASI-01 Prompt Injection core/pkg/threatscan/, guarded execution boundary
ASI-02 Tool Poisoning contract validation, firewall, connector validation
ASI-03 Excessive Permission policy and effect-boundary packages
ASI-04 Insufficient Validation guardian, manifest, schema, and policy packages
ASI-05 Improper Output Handling evidence, receipts, and verification flow
ASI-06 Resource Overuse budget and execution-control packages
ASI-07 Cascading Effects proof graph and effect tracking
ASI-08 Sensitive Data Exposure firewall, policy, and receipt material
ASI-09 Insecure Tool Integration MCP, connector, and schema surfaces
ASI-10 Insufficient Monitoring evidence export, proof graph, and verification commands

Use this page as an implementation map. Validation still depends on the code, tests, and verification commands in the repository.

Coverage Discipline

OWASP Agentic Top 10 coverage must stay evidence-backed. For each risk, name the HELM AI Kernel control, the code or schema that implements it, the public example or fixture that exercises it, and the residual risk that remains outside the OSS boundary. Do not imply that policy evaluation replaces app authorization, secrets management, sandboxing, or network egress controls. The strongest public page shows both prevention and observability: how a risky action is blocked, how the receipt records it, how the verifier checks it, and what an operator should inspect when the action is allowed under policy.

Link every mitigation to a concrete evidence artifact so evaluators can check the claim without reading unrelated implementation internals.